RESPONSE
Paul W. Taylor

1. I would like to clarify at the outset what it
means to make value judgments from a non-conscious organism's standpoint (or what it means
to take that standpoint in making such judgments). The phrases "from X's standpoint" or
"taking X's standpoint" can be eliminated
entirely, if we wish. We would then simply talk
about making judgments concerning what benefits X or harms X when using, as our standard
for such judgments, the preservation and
enhancement of X's existence and well-being.
To make such judgments on the basis of that
standard is to take the organism's standpoint.
Doing this need not require imagining ourselves·
to be the organism, or empathetically identifying with it, or fancifully placing ourselves in its
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is a (prima facie) reason why it ought not be
done. To respect nature is to believe that wild
animals and plants have inherent worth and to
act accordingly. And this is to accept the fact that
an action will preserve the natural existence of a
wild animal or plant as a reason for doing it, and
to accept the fact that an action will harm a wild
animal or plant, or will destroy its wildness, as a
reason against doing it.
This view presupposes a conception of individual organisms as teleological centers of life.
The best defense of this conception is to be
found in a very recent article: Harley Cahen,
"Against the Moral Considerability of
Ecosystems" (Environmental Ethics 10/3 (1988),
pp. 195-216.). Cahen presents a clear analysis of
teleological concepts and explanations in biology
and shows how non-conscious organisms can correctly be said to be goal-oriented. Cahen also
explains in what sense living things, unlike
machines, mountains, and other inanimate
objects, have goals of their own.
4. If respecting nature entails accepting the
aforementioned reason-for-action propositions,
what is the rational justification for accepting
them? Whatever it may be, it will also be thejustification for regarding all wild living things as
having inherent worth and hence the justification for adopting the ultimate moral attitude
of respect for nature. Watson says that, according
to my view, "... the only way to argue for adopting
an ultimate moral attitude is to exhibit what it
would mean for moral agents to believe and act
on it." This is not my view. I hold that the only
way to argue for adopting an ultimate moral
attitude is by showing the rational acceptability of
a system of nonmoral beliefs about the world (in
particular, the system of beliefs I call the biocentric outlook) and then showing the
coherence that holds between these beliefs and
the ultimate attitude (which entails the incoherence involved in accepting the beliefs and
adopting any attitude incompatible with the
ultimate one). There is no circularity here, since
the justification of the beliefs does not require
the taking of the attitude, nor does it assume that
the attitude is itselfjustified.
5. On the matter of rights, in my book I argue
against using the language of rights to ground

situation, or the like. Watson affirms that
objective considerations, knowable in ordinary
empirical ways, can provide evidence for the
truth ofjudgments about what is good or bad for
an organism without presupposing that it is conscious. So we both agree that it is possible to
make correct judgments about these matters on
objective grounds. However, I would want to
emphasize that accurate, sustained, and biologically enlightened observations of an organism
and its reactions to its environment enable us to
make more reliable judgments of that sort judgmen ts that are more likely to be true than
those made under less favorable epistemic conditions. I would also add that our understanding of
an organism's nature and of why it does what it
does is augmented and deepened as we become
directly acquainted with it as a unique individual.
There is nothing mysterious about this kind of
acquaintanceship or familiarity. It occurs, for
example, when a person takes daily care of a
houseplant and sees to its healthy growth.
2. It is unfortunate that my term "moral
subject" gave rise to the idea that I was assuming
every entity that is a moral subject to be conscious. The traditional term "moral patien t"
means the same thing, but I avoided using it
because it sounds odd to readers who ordinarily
think of "patients" in health care contexts. But
my definition of "moral subject" (quoted by
Watson) makes clear that the presence of consciousness, or even simple sentience, is not
implied.
3. Now for the central point. If we do regard a
living thing (conscious or non-conscious) as
having inherent worth (or "moral considerability", i.e., as being worthy of the moral consideration of all moral agents), then true judgments
about what benefits it become components of
reason-for-action propositions. Such propositions
are of the form: The fact that a certain act will
benefit an organism is a reason to do it, other
things being equal. To generalize: For any action
X, if X is instrumental to the preservation or
well-being of an animal or plant, X ought to be
done for that reason, other things being equal.
Correspondingly, for any action Y that is
destructive or detrimental to the existence and
well-being of an animal or plant, that fact about Y
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the duties we have to nonhumans. I try to show
why the use of such language tends to be misleading. (Watson quotes one of my arguments
for this, from page 247 of my book.) If having
moral rights is taken to mean nothing more than
having inherent worth, however, then my
argument (based on coherence with the biocentric outlook) that all animals and plants have
inherent worth is also an argument that all
animals and plants have moral rights.
6. It is true that only human moral agents can
believe that animals and plants have inherent
worth and only such humans can attribute that
kind of value to them. But these facts leave open
the question: Do animals and plants in truth
have inherent worth? If they do, they are
deserving of moral consideration by any actual
moral agents. Should there come a time when no
moral agents exist, animals and plants would not
thereby lose their inherent worth. It's just that no
one would then recognize such worth and no
moral consideration of those who deserve it
would be forthcoming. We don't create their
worth, we recognize it (if we are in the epistemic
position of being able to recognize it). Their
worth, it might be said, is a moral fact, the existence of which does not depend on the existence
of moral agents. (In this respect inherent worth
is to be contrasted with intrinsic value and
inherent value.) One might call this a form of
moral realism. It has to do with the truth of
reason-for-action propositions, not with their justification (the reasons for believing them to be
true).
7. A final note. Professor Watson's claim that I
have expressed "genocidal hatred for the human
race" is a total distortion of my thought. First, the
whole thrust of my argument in the book right
up to the end is that human ethics (human
duties and rights based on the foundation of
respect for persons) must be brought into
balance with environmental ethics (our duties to
wild living things based on the foundation of
respect for nature). I never claim that environmental ethics should take priority over human
ethics, much less overthrow or replace it.
Secondly, the particular passage Watson refers to
in my book is a hypothetical assertion made in
the context of an imaginary state of affairs in
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which the human species has become extinct.
The statement reads: "And if we were to take the
standpoint of that Life community [now understood as all wild animals and plants, Homo sapiens
having disappeared] and give voice to its true
interest, the ending of the human epoch on
Earth would most likely be greeted with a hearty
'Good riddance!'" (page 115). I leave it to the
reader to decide whether this hypothetical
assertion expresses genocidal hatred for the
h u'man race.
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Papers on any topic impacting ethical issues concerning nonhuman animals are welcome. Possible
topics include:
• The moral (in)significance of being natural (as
opposed to domesticated or genetically engineered).
• Are Animal Liberation Front activities consonant
with an animal rights ethic?
• Historical studies of conceptions of the moral
standing of animals.
Papers must be double-spaced and be ten to
fifteen pages in length. Those interested in submitting papers should make their intention along
with an indication of the projected topic known as
soon as that is possible. Final papers, or substantive drafts, must be received by September
15,1989.
Send statements of intent and papers to:
Professor Steve F. Sapontzis
Department of Philosophy
California State University
Hayward, California 94542
Those interested in chairing the session or in being
commentators should also contact Prof. Sapontzis
by September 15.
(Papers and comments will subsequently be published in Between the Species.)
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